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CRIMINAL LAW-THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL-THE
SUPREME COURT MINIMIZES THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY MAXIMIZING THE DEFERENCE AWARDED TO BARELY
COMPETENT DEFENSE ATTORNEYS. Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551
(2004).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is of utmost importance in en-
suring that a criminal defendant is treated fairly throughout the criminal
proceedings against him.1 This right has continuously evolved throughout
the last three centuries and continues to evolve today.2 Originally, the right
to counsel was highly restricted, allowing only those who could afford
counsel and those who were being tried in the federal system to have assis-
tance of counsel. 3 Today, the Sixth Amendment, together with the Four-
teenth Amendment, guarantees that all criminal defendants in state and fed-
eral courts are afforded assistance of counsel, regardless of their financial
situation.4
The right to counsel today is the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel.5 Twenty years ago the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
of what constituted effective assistance and handed down standards to be
used when determining if an attorney's performance met this competency
requirement. 6 In making this determination, the Court found that an attor-
ney's conduct must meet a reasonableness requirement and must not be
prejudicial to the defendant. In evaluating a defense counsel's performance,
the court's ultimate inquiry is whether the trial was fair.8
This note explains the development of the current standards used by
courts in evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims and how the
United States Supreme Court utilized these standards in Florida v. Nixon,9 a
case that broadens the range of reasonableness of an attorney's perform-
1. DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY, 208 (1976).
2. Id. at 209-18.
3. Martin C. Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard
for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 417-18 (1988).
4. Id. at 418. The Supreme Court has held that although all defendants accused of
felonies have an absolute right to counsel, those accused of misdemeanors are guaranteed the
right to counsel only in cases where the possible punishment is imprisonment, regardless of
the amount of time. Argersingler v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
5. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV.
425,431 (1996).
6. Id. at 434-39.
7. Id. at 434-37.
8. Id. at 438.
9. 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004).
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ance.' ° This note first details the facts behind Florida v. Nixon that brought
the parties involved before the Supreme Court." Next, it explores the his-
tory of the right to effective assistance of counsel and how that right has
evolved and expanded from early English common law into what it is to-
day. 12 This note then explains and elaborates on the reasoning behind the
Supreme Court's decision in Nixon, and finally ends with a discussion of the
significance of this decision and what the future may hold for defendants
who assert a violation of their right to effective assistance of counsel. 13
II. FACTS
On August 14, 1984, Joe Elton Nixon was arrested for the kidnapping
and murder of Jeanne Bickner. 14 The police found her body the day before
in a wooded area outside Tallahassee, Florida.' 5 Bickner had been tied to a
tree with jumper cables and burned alive. 16 Her left leg, left arm, and almost
all of her hair and skin had been burned away.17 Bickner's car was found by
police the next day in Tallahassee after having been set on fire.' 8 Nixon was
arrested after his brother notified the police that Nixon had told him of the
murder. 19
Nixon gave police a lengthy confession of the crime.2 ° He told police
that he had approached Bickner in a mall, and, after he asked for her assis-
tance in starting his car, she offered him a ride home.2' Nixon later forced
Bickner into her trunk and drove her to a secluded area where he then mur-
dered her.22 Nixon admitted that Bickner had begged for her life but that he
decided to kill her anyway, burning her along with some of the personal
items from her car.23
Aside from his confession, the police had overwhelming evidence of
Nixon's guilt.24 Eyewitness testimony placed Nixon with Bickner in the
10. Id.
11. See infra Part 11.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Parts IV and V.
14. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 556.
15. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004) (No.
03-931).
16. Id. at 3.
17. 1d.










mall parking lot on the day of the offense, and he was spotted driving her
car alone later that same day.25 Nixon's brother, along with his girlfriend,
stated to police that Nixon had told them of the murder and showed them
her car and two rings he had stolen from her, which he later pawned.26 After
Bickner's car was discovered, police found Nixon's fingerprints throughout
the car, and the keys and gas cap were found after Nixon told police where
he had hid them.27
Nixon was indicted for first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and
arson, and a public defender, Michael Corin, was appointed to represent
him. 28 Corin filed a plea of not guilty on Nixon's behalf, but after beginning
the discovery process, realized that there was overwhelming evidence
against his client.29 Corin tried to negotiate with the prosecution, but the
state refused to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment instead of
death.30 Fearing that he would be discredited by the jury if he argued at trial
that Nixon was innocent in light of all the evidence against him, Corin de-
cided to concede Nixon's involvement in the crime, and focus on providing
mitigating evidence of Nixon's mental condition during the penalty phase of
the trial.31 Corin discussed this proposal with Nixon, but Nixon never ap-
proved or disapproved of his strategy, so Corin proceeded on his own pro-
fessional judgment.32
During voir dire Nixon demonstrated strange and disruptive behavior.
33
He refused to enter the courtroom and stated that he did not want to attend
his trial.34 The trial judge ruled that he had voluntarily waived his right to
attend his own trial, and except for a brief amount of time during the second
day of trial, Nixon was absent from the courtroom. 35 After the trial began,
Corin emphasized to the jury the importance of the penalty phase of the
trial.3 6 He conceded Nixon's guilt during opening statements, presented no
defense, cross-examined very few witnesses, and did not object to the intro-




27. Id. at 4.
28. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 556.
29. Id.




34. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 557.
35. Id. at 557 & n.3.
36. Id. at 557-58.




During the penalty phase of the trial, Corin argued to the jury that
Nixon was mentally unstable and presented testimony from eight witnesses,
including a psychologist and a psychiatrist, to support his argument.39 He
also introduced over forty exhibits that described or explained Nixon's be-
havioral problems.40 The prosecution presented little evidence to contradict
Corin's argument. 4' Nevertheless, the jury recommended a sentence of
death, which was imposed by the trial court.42
On direct appeal, Nixon argued through new counsel to the Florida Su-
preme Court that Corin's performance amounted to ineffective assistance of
counsel.4 3 Nixon argued that Corin's concession of his guilt during trial was
the "functional equivalent of a guilty plea" that he had not expressly con-
sented to.an Nixon argued that prejudice should be presumed because Corin
did not put the state's case through "meaningful adversarial testing."45 The
Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to
determine if Nixon had consented to Corin's strategy, but later affirmed his
46conviction without ruling on the ineffective assistance issue.
Nixon then filed a motion for postconviction relief in the Florida state
judicial system, reaffirming his "'presumption of prejudice' ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim. '47 The trial court rejected Nixon's claim and af-
firmed his conviction, but the Florida Supreme Court ultimately reversed,
finding that there was no evidence in the record to indicate whether or not
Nixon expressly approved or disapproved of Corin's strategy.4 8 Without
express consent the court stated that a defense counsel who concedes his
client's guilt is per se ineffective, and prejudice is presumed against the
defendant. 49 The Florida Supreme Court granted Nixon a new trial, and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a de-
fense counsel's performance is automatically ineffective if he concedes his
client's guilt during trial without his client's express permission.50
39. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 9, Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004) (No.
03-931).
40. Id. at 10.
41. See id. at 9.
42. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 558.
43. Id. at 559.
44. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 11, Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004) (No.
03-931).
45. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 559.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 560.
49. Id. at 559.




The right to effective assistance of counsel has a long and fascinating
history that began an entire century before the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution was even in existence. 51 This section explores the
evolution of the modem day right to counsel, beginning with its origin in
early English common law.52 Next, this section traces the continued trans-
formation of this right during the American colonial period and throughout
the formation and development of the Sixth Amendment.53 Finally, this sec-
tion examines the United States Supreme Court's landmark decisions during
the last century that have expanded the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel to what it is today.54
A. Early English Beginnings
Until the middle of the eighteenth century, English common law
strictly prohibited the use of counsel to represent criminal defendants ac-
cused of felonies.55 Only defendants accused of misdemeanors, less serious
crimes not punishable by death, had the right to be represented by a lawyer,
while those accused of felonies or treason did not have this option.5 6 Some-
51. JAMES J. TOMKOvICz, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 2 (2002).
52. See infra Part III.A.
53. See infra Part III.B
54. See infra Part III.C.
55. ToMKovIcz, supra note 51, at 3.
56. FELLMAN, supra note 1, at 209. Experts have given three reasons for the strict ad-
herence to the common law rule in England. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 51, at 3. First of all, the
English government was in constant fear of its own demise. Id. The survival of the English
monarchy was thought to be in constant jeopardy, and felons were seen as direct threats
against the government. Id. at 4. The monarchy lacked the police forces necessary to enforce
its laws and to gather evidence of crimes. Id. Therefore, cases against criminal defendants
were often very weak, and allowing the defendants to retain professional representation
would only impair the monarchy's ability to isolate governmental threats. Id. at 4. Those
accused of misdemeanors were not considered to be as dangerous a threat, and thus, they
were allowed to hire an attorney. Id. Only defendants who put the government most at peril
were denied counsel. Id.
A second reason was that criminal proceedings during that time were thought to be
simple, and, therefore, defendants did not need counsel. Id. Some historians have dismissed
this reason as unfounded because it makes little sense to allow a defendant accused of a
minor offense to retain counsel, while the defendants with the most at stake could not. Id. at
5.
The third explanation is that a neutral judge presided over all criminal proceedings
and was in the best position to adequately protect the interests of the defendant. Id. Under
this theory, all parties involved in a criminal trial had a duty to look after the defendant's
interests. Id. Historians agree that the practical effect of this explanation is limited. Id. For
example, the defendant was incarcerated up until the time of trial, so any prepared defense
2005]
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times a judge might allow an attorney to assist a defendant before trial in
understanding the nature of the law and the accusations against him, but the
attorney was never allowed to appear on behalf of the defendant in court.57
On the other hand, there was no rule preventing trained lawyers from repre-
senting the victims in the case.58 There were no public prosecutors, but the
victim was allowed to hire an attorney to prosecute the case. 59 However, this
was rare because there was little need for a trained attorney to conduct the
prosecution when the defendant was forced to represent himself.
60
The first codified change of the common law rule denying counsel
came in 1695 when Parliament enacted The Treason Act, which stated that
every person accused of treason was allowed to retain an attorney. 61 After
the passage of The Treason Act, though the rights it provided were limited,
judges began to slowly allow those accused of felonies to have legal repre-
62sentation. It is uncertain why this came about, but most likely it began
with the judges' own sense of unfairness within the court system.63 The trial
judges had complete discretion in determining if and how much a defense
attorney could be utilized by the defendant. 64 This varied greatly from court
to court, but by the middle of the eighteenth century, the common law de-
nial of defense counsel had become lax.65 Though more and more courts
were allowing the accused to retain a lawyer, a statutory right to effective
assistance of counsel was not enacted by the English Parliament until 1836,
almost fifty years after the Sixth Amendment was ratified in the United
States.66
B. The Right to Counsel in Colonial America and the Formation of the
Sixth Amendment
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, colonists in America had
already developed different attitudes toward the legal profession than their
was prepared behind bars. Id. Also, the defendant had no right to require witnesses to testify
on his behalf, and every defendant was assumed to be guilty. Id.




61. FELLMAN, supra note 1, at 210. This Act was adopted by the Whigs after several of
the party's members were falsely accused of treason. Before the Act was passed, the crime
was prosecuted by trained lawyers, often the attorney general, and those accused of treason
were unable to adequately defend themselves against these prosecutors. TOMKOVICZ, supra
note 51, at 6.
62. BEATTIE, supra note 57, at 359.
63. Id.
64. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 51, at 7.




English counterparts. 67 The forward progress of the right to counsel moved
at a much faster pace in America.68 Americans generally felt that criminal
defendants should have more rights than those afforded in England.69
Trained lawyers were more widely available than in England, and it was
easier for criminal defendants to have access to these lawyers. 70 Naturally,
as more and more judges in America were allowing the accused to consult
counsel, the colonists began to realize how unfair it was to deny legal repre-
sentation to those who needed it most. 71
Before the federal constitution was adopted, many colonies were en-
suring the constitutional or statutory right to assistance of counsel for crimi-
nal defendants. 72 Even those colonies who had not codified this right al-
lowed their criminal defendants to retain an attorney through their common
law.73 The only state that still enforced the strict English common law by
the time the federal constitution was adopted was Georgia, which even after
the Sixth Amendment was adopted still strictly limited the right to counsel
for another seven years.74
When the Framers of the United States Constitution gathered in Phila-
delphia during the summer of 1787, it was obvious that the colonists deeply
valued the security of established fundamental rights, such as the right to
counsel, as a vast majority of the states had already guaranteed these per-
sonal rights and liberties to their citizens through their state constitutions.
75
When the Framers finally recognized that a federal constitution would never
be ratified by every state until they were promised a Bill of Rights, the dis-
pute turned to what liberties should actually be included in the Bill of
Rights.76 After the Constitution had been ratified by all thirteen states,
James Madigon focused his attention on the drafting of the declaration of
rights.77 He reported his proposed amendments to Congress in 1789, one of
which contained that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
67. Id. at 9.
68. FELLMAN, supra note 1, at 209.
69. Id.
70. ToMKovicz, supra note 51, at 9. The colonists used public prosecutors to prosecute
crimes against the accused rather than allowing the victims to do so. Id. This is the reason
there were more trained lawyers in America than in England at this time. Id.
71. Id. at 10.
72. FELLMAN, supra note 1, at 210.
73. Id. Justice Sutherland, in Powell v. Alabama, found that the English common law
rule had been rejected in at least twelve of the thirteen original colonies. 287 U.S. 45, 64
(1932).
74. ToMKovlcz, supra note 51, at 13.
75. Id. at 14.
76. Id. at 17.
77. Id. at 19.
2005]
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the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 78 The pro-
posals were slightly changed as they were forwarded through both houses of
Congress but at all times the right of counsel remained. 79 Ten amendments
were ratified by the states, and in 1791, the right to assistance of counsel
became a part of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
s°
C. The United States Supreme Court's Landmark Decisions
From the time of its ratification in 1791, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, along with all other rights afforded in the Bill of Rights, protected
citizens only from actions taken by the federal government.81 The Bill of
Rights did not apply to the states.8 2 The Fourteenth Amendment was added
to the Constitution in 1868, which stated that "[n]o state shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 83
Though this required that each state afford its citizens due process, it would
still be years before the right to effective assistance of counsel was guaran-
teed for all criminal defendants in state courts.
8 4
1. Powell v. Alabama
The first case in which the Supreme Court tackled the decision of how
the right to assistance of counsel would apply in state courts, Powell v. Ala-
bama,8 5 was not until 1932.86 Before 1932, the Court had not decided
whether indigent defendants were entitled to appointed counsel in federal
proceedings, and it had not decided at all whether state criminal defendants
were entitled to any rights through the federal Constitution. 7 The main
question the Court was confronted with was whether the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when a state court failed to ade-
quately appoint counsel for indigent defendants.
88
In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. ToMKovIcz, supra note 51, at 20.
81. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833). In reality, the right to counsel at this
time had a very limited effect on criminal prosecutions. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 51, at 21.
Very few criminal cases were tried at the federal level, so very few defendants actually en-
joyed this right. Id.
82. Barron, 32 U.S. at 250; ToMKoviCz, supra note 51, at 21.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
84. ToMKovIcz, supra note 5 1, at 21.
85. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).





In a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and
is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of igno-
rance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the
court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law[.]
89
The Court determined that the defendants in this case, seven young black
males charged with the rape of two white girls, were "ignorant and illiter-
ate," were not given a fair opportunity to retain counsel, and because coun-
sel was not designated for the defendants until the morning of trial, any as-
sistance received from the appointed attorney could not have been effec-
tive. 90 The Court stated that during the most critical times of the proceed-
ings against the defendants, they were without the assistance of counsel, and
because of this, they were denied a fundamental right, one which the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to protect.91 The
Court limited its holding to the unique circumstances in the case, and re-
fused to rule on whether there was a right to appointed counsel in non-
capital cases.92 The Supreme Court had drawn a distinction between capital
and non-capital offenses, and this mandated the lower courts to do the
same.
93
This was the first instance in which the Court recognized that counsel
must also be effective.94 Though counsel had technically been appointed for
the defendants, they presented no defense on their behalf whatsoever, and
the Court found this unacceptable. 95 However, it would still be half a cen-
tury before the Court would fully develop the standard for effective assis-
tance of counsel.9 6
89. Id. at 71. The facts of this case were disturbing. Seven young African American
males were charged with the crime of raping two young white girls. Id. On the day of the
incident, the defendants were on a train in Alabama along with seven white boys and the two
alleged victims. Id. After a fight broke out between the young men, the majority of the white
boys were thrown from the train, after which, the victims claimed they were sexually as-
saulted by the defendants. Id. The defendants were escorted from the train by the local mili-
tia, pled not guilty at their arraignment, and were incarcerated until trial. Id.
90. Id. at 52-56.
91. Powell, 281 U.S. at 67. The defendants were not appointed counsel until the morn-
ing of trial. Id. at 57. The Court noted what they considered the "critical periods of the pro-
ceedings" as "from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when con-
sultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important." Id.
92. Id. at 71.
93. FELLMAN, supra note 1, at 212.
94. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the





2. Johnson v. Zerbst
Six years after Powell was decided, the Supreme Court expanded the
provisions of the Sixth Amendment by holding that every criminal defen-
dant in the federal system had the right to court-appointed counsel unless
that right was waived in Johnson v. Zerbst.97 The Court once again empha-
sized the difficulties faced by a layman who is brought before the court
without an attorney.98 The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment "embod-
ies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant
does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought
before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecu-
tion is presented by experienced and learned counsel." 99 Though the Court
expressed its belief that a defendant could not receive a fair trial without
assistance of counsel, the Court realized that even such a fundamental right
can be waived.'00 This waiver, however, is only effective if the defendant
makes an "intelligent and competent" waiver of his rights, and it is up to the
trial court to determine if the waiver has been properly executed.'0 ' The
Court explained that in order for a court to have proper jurisdiction to secure
a conviction of a criminal defendant, the court must first ensure that the
defendant had assistance of counsel throughout the proceedings, or that the
defendant "competently and intelligently" waived that right.1
0 2
3. Betts v. Brady
In 1942 the Supreme Court seemed to reverse its position when it re-
fused to hold that all indigent defendants in state criminal proceedings had
the right to appointed counsel through the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment in Betts v. Brady.10 3 Instead of continuing to expand the
right to counsel as it had done in recent cases, the Court developed what
some scholars call the "special circumstances" rule.'04 This rule required
97. 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938). The defendant was an enlisted marine who had been
charged with the possession and use of counterfeit money. Id. at 459. He, and a co-defendant,
were told of their indictment, arraigned, and convicted all in the same day, all without the
assistance of an attorney. Id. at 460.
98. Id. at 463.
99. Id. at 462-63.
100. Id. at 464.
101. Id. at 465. There was no evidence that the defendant had requested an attorney from
the trial court, and the District Attorney asserted that because there was no request, the de-
fendant had waived his right to counsel. Id. at 461.
102. Id. at 468.
103. 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
104. Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon's Shadow: The Loss of Defendant Autonomy
and the Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 363, 371 (2003).
[Vol. 28
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courts to examine the particular circumstances in each case and then make a
determination as to whether the appointment of counsel would be necessary
to "promote fundamental fairness."'05 The Court explained that due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights to
the states, but that under certain circumstances, the Fourteenth Amendment
could be violated by a state's denial of these rights.10 6 The Court discussed
the right of counsel in terms of the states' constitutions and relied on the
fact that the majority of the states did not consider the right to appointed
counsel a fundamental right. 0 7 The Court also deferred to the trial judge's
position that, because the defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the trial
judge was able to "control the course of the trial" and "see impartial justice
done."' 08 The Court reasoned that the defendant was not at a serious disad-
vantage in this case, and, therefore, was given a fair trial even without the
assistance of counsel. 09
4. Chandler v. Fretag
Though the Supreme Court continued its "special circumstances"
analysis for twenty years after Betts, the Court distinguished between the
right to have counsel appointed and the right to retain counsel in 1954."0 In
Chandler v. Fretag, the Court declared an absolute right to retain counsel no
matter the circumstances."' Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court,
distinguished this case from Betts in that the defendant did not ask the trial
judge to appoint an attorney, but rather requested a continuance so that he
could obtain his own attorney." 2 The Court held that any time a defendant
is denied a reasonable opportunity to retain a lawyer, regardless of whether
105. Id.
106. Betts, 316 U.S. at 462. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black expressed his view that
the Sixth Amendment should be applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 474-76 (Black, J., dissenting). He disagreed with the majority that the right to counsel is
not a fundamental right, and stated that a trial can never be fair if there is a possibility that an
innocent man will be convicted because of his poverty. Id. (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
Black was later vindicated. He wrote the opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, which overturned
Betts. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
107. Betts, 316 U.S. at 471. At the time, Maryland, the state in which the trial took place,
only appointed counsel for defendants charged with rape or murder. Id. at 457.
Also, the Betts Court reasoned that if the right to counsel was awarded to those whose "lib-
erty" only was at stake through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court would also have to award the right to counsel in civil cases where "property" was at
stake. Id. at 473.
108. Id. at 472.
109. Id. at 472-73.
110. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954).
111. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 9.
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he would be entitled to have one appointed for him, he is ultimately de-
prived of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 
1 3
5. Gideon v. Wainwright
The last major decision in the expansion of the right to counsel oc-
curred in 1963.114 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held once
and for all that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guar-
anteed the right to government-appointed counsel by the states to all indi-
gent criminal defendants. 15 The Court overturned Betts, abandoned its
"special circumstances" analysis, and concluded that the right to counsel is
a right which is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial."'"1 6 In doing so, the
Court relied on its own past precedent and reasoning and concluded that the
decision of Betts was misguided and that the Court had therefore erred in
failing to follow the path of its earlier precedents.1 7 The Court emphasized
its earlier reasoning that it would not be fair to require a layperson to defend
himself against a trained prosecutor, and while many defendants can afford
to retain his own counsel, some cannot.'1 8 Allowing some defendants to
retain their own defense attorney while others must face the prosecutors
alone because of their financial situation undermines the idea that all are
equal under the law, one of the very ideas that the due process clause was
founded on." 9
Though not mentioned by the Court, scholars have suggested several
other factors that could have played a part in overturning Betts.120 One,
though the Betts doctrine was still good law and was still followed by many
state courts, the Supreme Court had already seemed to disregard the "spe-
cial circumstances" rule.' 2 1 Second, during the time that Gideon was de-
cided, the country was in a state of social unrest. 22 Minorities were de-
manding equality and civil rights activists were prominent. 23 Many of the
113. Id. at 10.
114. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
115. Id. at 344. The Court later interpreted this decision to mean that only defendants
charged with a felony have the right to government-appointed counsel, Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994), and defendants charged with misdemeanors that have a possible
sentence of imprisonment are afforded the right to government-appointed counsel, Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). For a full discussion of Gideon v. Wainwright, see ANTHONY
LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
116. Zelnick, supra note 104, at 372.
117. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. TOMKoviCz, supra note 5 1, at 33.
121. Id.




accused who were denied appointed counsel were minorities, and the
Court's actions in Gideon were another step in ensuring that all racial and
ethnic groups were afforded equal justice. 2 4 Finally, the Court must have
completely disagreed with some of the reasoning behind Betts. 25 Betts re-
lied on the principles that many defendants could receive a fair trial without
assistance of counsel and that these defendants could always be identi-
fied.' 2 6 The Court, however, must have realized that this was only true in
very few cases, and that the right of counsel must be guaranteed to all de-
fendants.
27
Gideon was the last case in which the United States Supreme Court re-
viewed the applicability of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to state
felony proceedings. 2 8 In cases following the Gideon decision, the Court
shifted its focus from whether a right to counsel existed at all to whether the
counsel had met a minimum level of representation as to assure that the
right to counsel had been fulfilled. 129
D. The Modem Standard of Right to Counsel
After Gideon was decided, it was no longer in question whether the
government, federal or state, was required to either appoint or allow the
retention of defense counsel. 130 The question became whether or not the
counsel performed at a constitutionally accepted level. 13 The Supreme
Court had not specified a standard for determining the adequacy of defense
counsel's performance, and it would not do so for over twenty years after
the Gideon case was decided. 32 It was clear, however, that the right to as-
sistance of counsel meant more than simply an attorney standing next to a
defendant in court. 133 The Court had recognized that "the right to assistance
of counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.' 34 The notion
of effective assistance of counsel can be found as early as the Powell deci-
sion, where the situation reversed by the Court was one of "inadequate rep-




126. ToMKovicz, supra note 51, at 34.
127. Id.
128. Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 432.
129. Id.
130. Zelnick, supra note 104, at 373.
131. Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 432.
132. Zelnick, supra note 104, at 373.
133. Calhoun, supra note 3, at 415.
134. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
135. Zelnick, supra note 104, at 375.
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Before Gideon, lower courts often found that due process violations
due to incompetent counsel occurred when the counsel's performance
amounted to a "farce and mockery of justice.' 36 After Gideon was handed
down, courts began to abandon this standard, and differing standards for
evaluating the effectiveness of counsel emerged. 137 Most circuits agreed that
counsel's performance must be reasonable; however, many disagreed as to
whether, and how much, prejudice should have been shown for the defen-
dant's conviction to be overturned. 138 Some courts put the burden of proving
prejudice on the defendant, while others determined that it was the prosecu-
tion's duty to show that a counsel's deficient performance was harmless
error. 139 Finally, in 1984, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two sepa-
rate cases to issue a nationwide standard to determine the adequacy of coun-
sel.
140
1. The Current Tests of Strickland and Cronic
In Strickland v. Washington,14 1 the Court handed down a two-prong
test for determining whether a conviction should be overturned due to inef-
fective assistance of counsel. 42 First, the defendant seeking relief must
136. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of
Cronic's Call to Presume Prejudice From Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REv. 827,
837 (2003).
137. Id.
138. Zelnick, supra note 104 at 376-77. In 1980, the Supreme Court shed some light on
the issue of prejudice when it held prejudice can be presumed when the defendant's counsel
represents a conflict of interest. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). The Court held
that in order to presume prejudice, the defendant must prove that "an actual conflict of inter-
est adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Id.
139. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 135, at 837.
140. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648
(1984).
141. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
142. Id. at 687. In this case, the defendant was indicted on charges of kidnapping, murder
and several other crimes after he and two accomplices were arrested after going on a ten day
crime spree. Id. at.672. An attorney was appointed to represent him. Id. Against his counsel's
advice, the defendant confessed to the murders, waived his right to a jury trial, and plead
guilty to all charges. Id. In preparing for the sentencing hearing, counsel did not present any
evidence concerning the defendant's emotional state but instead relied on the defendant's
declared remorse and earlier cooperation with police to try to spare him from receiving the
death penalty. Id. at 673-74. The judge did in fact sentence the defendant to death, and the
defendant challenged the sentence claiming that his counsel's performance during the sen-
tencing proceedings amounted to ineffective assistance. Id. at 675.
After failing in his attempt to seek relief in the state postconviction system, the
defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court, once again claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 678. The District Court affirmed the conviction, con-
cluding that although the defense counsel made errors throughout the proceedings, the de-
fendant was not prejudiced by these errors. Id. at 679. The District Court further found that
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show that his or her counsel's performance was deficient. 43 The Court de-
fined deficiency in terms of reasonableness, stating that "the proper standard
for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance."' 44 Sec-
ond, the defendant must then show that he or she was prejudiced by this
deficient performance. 45 In order to show prejudice, the defendant must
show by a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different if not for the counsel's deficient performance. 46 The Court
established a high level of deference to be given to defense attorneys, and
warned that the differing circumstances in each case required the lower
courts to examine ineffective assistance claims on a case-by-case basis.
147
The Court urged lower courts to always presume that the counsel's per-
formance was not deficient, but rather that it "[fell] within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.' 48
On the same day as Strickland, the Court decided a second case to
specify when prejudice could be presumed under the second prong of the
Strickland test.149 In United States v. Cronic, the Supreme Court recognized
three exceptions to the Strickland test, declaring that anytime one of these.
three circumstances is present, prejudice against the defendant is presumed
and the Strickland test does not have to be met. 150 First, prejudice is pre-
sumed anytime there is a "complete denial of counsel" at a critical stage in
the trial.' 5 ' Second, anytime that "counsel entirely fails to subject the prose-
there was no possibility that the outcome of the sentencing hearing would have been different
if defense counsel had not committed any errors. Id.
The then Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (now the Eleventh Circuit) reversed the
judgment of the District Court and remanded the case. Id. The Court of Appeals stated that
ineffective assistance claims should be viewed under a totality of the circumstances standard
and that to be granted relief, a defendant must show that his counsel's errors resulted in a
"substantial disadvantage" to his defense. Id. at 680-82. The Supreme Court ultimately af-




146. Id. at 694.
147. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
148. Id. at 689.
149. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
150. Id. at 658-63. In this case, the defendant was indicted on mail fraud charges. Id. at
649. After his retained lawyer withdrew from the case, the court appointed a young attorney
with real estate experience twenty-five days before trial. Id. The Government had investi-
gated the case for over four years. Id. The defendant was convicted after a four day trial in
which his counsel put on no defense. Id. The Court ultimately denied relief, stating that the
circumstances in this case did not "make it unlikely that the defendant could have received
the effective assistance of counsel. "Id. at 666.
151. Id. at 659. An example of this is when the defendant is denied access to his counsel.
Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 441. For example, in Geders v. United States, prejudice against
the defendant was presumed when a state judge refused to allow him to speak with his coun-
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cution's case to meaningful adversarial testing," prejudice is also pre-
sumed. 152 Third, "when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of
ineffectiveness," such as when the circumstances are such that even a com-
petent attorney would unlikely be able to effectively assist the defendant,
prejudice is presumed. 153
Recent cases have seemed to lower the standard set in Strickland and
Cronic.154 The Supreme Court revisited the issue in Cronic in 2002 when it
granted certiorari in Bell v. Cone.155 Bell allowed the Court to elaborate on
the second exception in Cronic, where the Court stated that a counsel's fail-
ure to put the state's case through meaningful adversarial testing "must be
complete" in order to fit within the Cronic exception. 156 In Bell, the defense
counsel only failed to test specific parts of the state's case, not the entire
case, and because of this the Court refused to presume prejudice against the
defendant. 157 One year later, in Yarborough v. Gentry, 58 the Court reaf-
firmed its position that courts, especially when hearing a case through fed-
eral habeas corpus, should be highly deferential to a defense attorney's
strategy. 159 The Court stated that "counsel has wide latitude in deciding how
sel during a seventeen hour overnight recess. 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976). This is also the case
when counsel is absent during critical stages of the trial. Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 444.
There has been some debate as to whether the word "denial" in Cronic implies that the ab-
sence of counsel must be due to state intervention in order for prejudice to be presumed.
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 134, at 858. However, the Supreme Court's interpretation
indicates that state action is not required for there to be a denial of counsel. Id. Prejudice may
be presumed even when counsel is absent due to his or her own personal reasons. Id.
152. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. Courts have held that this is the case when the conduct of
the attorney is extremely poor. Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 447. For example, prejudice was
presumed against the defendant when his counsel was at trial but refused to participate and
did not object when the court directed a verdict against his client. Harding v. Davis, 878 F.2d
1341, 1345 (11 th Cir. 1989). Other examples of this include when a defense counsel refuses
to investigate or interview alleged eye witnesses, Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 344 (Wyo.
1987), and when the defense counsel sleeps during trial, Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336,
349 (5th Cir. 2001).
153. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 660-62. In cases such as this, the idea is that the attorney cannot
provide adequate representation because of "an outside influence beyond the lawyer's con-
trol." Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 134, at 853. An example is when an attorney has a
conflict of interest in representing his client. Id. Under Holloway v. Arkansas, prejudice is
presumed when a trial judge refuses to address an objection made by the defendant as to a
possible conflict of interest. 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978). If an objection is not made at trial,
there is a limited presumption of prejudice when the conflict has an "adverse impact" on the
defendant's trial. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980).
154. Zelnick, supra note 104, at 379.
155. Donald J. Hall, Effectiveness of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 42 BRANDEIS L.J.
225, 226 (2003-04).
156. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 (2002).
157. Hall, supra note 155, at 227.
158. 540 U.S. 1 (2003).
159. Id. at 6.
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best to represent a client," and emphasized the importance of allowing
counsel to freely determine his own strategy and make tactical decisions
regarding how to proceed in closing statements. 60 The Court reiterated the
presumption that an attorney's strategy is reasonable unless a defendant can
prove otherwise. 61
In 2004 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Florida
v. Nixon to once again evaluate whether a defense counsel's performance
should be evaluated under the two-prong Strickland test, or whether preju-
dice should be presumed under Cronic.'
62
IV. REASONING
In Florida v. Nixon, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
held that a defense counsel's performance does not automatically amount to
ineffective assistance when the counsel does not obtain his client's express
consent to a trial strategy of conceding his guilt. 63 The Court rejected
Nixon's argument that prejudice should be presumed against a defendant
when his attorney concedes his involvement in the crime in order to focus
on the penalty phase of the trial. 64 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
focused its decision on two main concerns.165 First, the Court held that
Corin's concession of Nixon's guilt during the guilty phase of a trial was
not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, and, therefore, Nixon's ex-
press consent was not required. 66 Second, the Court determined that be-
cause this concession was not a guilty plea, Corin's performance should
have been analyzed under the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance
of counsel instead of the Cronic standard.1
67
A. A Concession of Guilt is Not a Guilty Plea
The Supreme Court stated in Taylor v. Illinois that although a defense
counsel has the obligation to discuss with his client possible trial strategies,
he is not required to "obtain the defendant's consent to 'every tactical deci-
sion. , 6' However, the Court realized the limitations imposed on an attor-
ney's authority to make decisions regarding his client. 69 Only the defendant
160. Id.
161. Id. at 8.
162. 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004).
163. Id. at 563.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 560-63.
166. Id. at 560.
167. Id. at 561.




may choose to waive his constitutional rights at trial or to plead guilty.
170
Before an attorney may act on behalf of the client concerning these issues,
the attorney must, after consultation with his client, obtain his express con-
sent to whatever action the attorney is about to take.
171
In Nixon the Court distinguished between an actual guilty plea and a
trial strategy. 172 The Court stated that a defendant who pleads guilty no
longer has the rights that would have been afforded to him throughout the
criminal trial. 173 The guilty plea itself is a conviction of the defendant, and
the prosecution is not required to come forward with evidence to prove the
defendant's guilt. 74 In order to plead guilty, the defense counsel must have
the defendant's consent, and mere acquiescence is not enough.
75
The Florida Supreme Court found that Corin's concession of Nixon's
guilt was the "functional equivalent of a guilty plea" that required Nixon's
express consent. 176 The United States Supreme Court did not agree. 177 The
Court emphasized that Nixon still had his rights at trial, and the prosecution
was still required to prove his guilt of all crimes charged to the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. 78 Nixon had the'right, through his counsel, to object to
the prosecution's evidence and to cross-examine their witnesses. 179 If Corin
had entered an actual guilty plea, Nixon would not have retained these
rights. 80 The Court put significant weight on the fact that though the state's
case was mostly uncontested, the state was still required to present its case
to the jury.
181
Because Corin's statements were not a guilty plea, the Court reasoned
that he was not required to obtain Nixon's express consent to his strategy. 82
Corin explained his proposed strategy to Nixon on more than one occa-
sion.183 Each time, Nixon was silent and refused to approve or disap-
prove. 84 The Court concluded that Corin acted reasonably in continuing






174. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 560.
175. Id.
176. Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618, 624 (2000).











B. Strickland, Rather than Cronic, Is the Appropriate Standard
The United States Supreme Court found that the court below had ap-
plied the wrong standard in analyzing Corin's performance. 186 In finding
that Corin's statements to the jury were essentially a guilty plea, the Florida
Supreme Court presumed prejudice against Nixon under United States v.
Cronic'87 instead of applying the standard in Strickland v. Washington,1
88
which would have placed the burden on Nixon to prove that Corin's per-
formance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced him. 189 The
Court explained that Cronic put forth exceptions to the Strickland standard
such that prejudice is presumed in "circumstances that are so likely to
prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular
case is unjustified."' 90 One such circumstance is when there is a complete
failure to put the state's case through "meaningful adversarial testing."
'1 91
The Court noted that it will only presume prejudice under Cronic in very
few instances. 1
92
Focusing on the case at hand, the United States Supreme Court stated
that, under the present circumstances, Corin's performance was not a com-
plete failure to test the state's case.1 93 Rather, the Court found that Corin's
decision to focus on the penalty phase of the trial was well founded. 194 Be-
cause of the nature of two-phase criminal trials, the Court realized the diffi-
cult decisions defense attorneys must often make when constructing their
trial strategies, especially when they know they are dealing with a guilty
client. 195 Furthermore, when plea negotiations between the prosecution and
the defense fail because the prosecution refuses to give up the death penalty,
saving the defendant's life is the defense counsel's most important objective
at trial; usually in circumstances such as this, evading the death penalty is
the most hopeful outcome the defendant may realistically have. 196 Noting
that jurors will discredit a defense attorney who completely denies the alle-
gations against his client during the guilt phase of the trial, and then begs
the jury to forgive his client during the penalty phase, the Court reasoned
186. Id.
187. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
188. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 562 (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658).
191. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 562.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 562-63.
195. Id. at 562.
196. Id. at 563.
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that an attorney is not ineffective just because he employs a strategy that he
hopes will put him in a favorable light to the jury.
97
C. The Court's Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court held that Corin's concession of
Nixon's guilt during the guilt phase of his trial was not the equivalent of a
guilty plea, and Corin, therefore, was not required to obtain Nixon's express
consent.198 Because consent was not required, Corin's performance was not
rendered unreasonable, and Nixon was not entitled to a presumption of
prejudice against him under Cronic.199 In order for Nixon to succeed on his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must meet the Strickland test by
making an affirmative showing that Corin's performance was deficient and
that this deficiency amounted to prejudice.2 °0
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Nixon is sig-
nificant in that it follows recent precedent in lowering the standard for ef-
fective assistance of counsel.201 In an attempt to clarify the application of
the standards for ineffective assistance, the Court once again raised the bur-
den for defendants trying to seek postconviction relief. First, the Nixon
holding broadens what is considered a reasonable strategy for defense attor-
neys.20 2 Second, it further limits when prejudice can be presumed against a
defendant. 203 Third, it gives attorneys a wider range of authority to act on
behalf of their clients without express assent from the client.204 Finally, the
decision overall makes it harder for a defendant to receive relief based on
ineffective assistance of counsel.20 5
A. The Wide Range of Reasonableness in Defense Counsel Strategies
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a defense counsel's
performance is not deficient if it falls within "the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. 20 6 The reasonableness of an attorney's conduct is
197. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 563.
198. Id. at 561.
199. Id. at 562.
200. Id.
201. Hall, supra note 155, at 225.
202. See infra Part V.A.
203. See infra Part V.B.
204. See infra Part V.C.
205. See infra Part V.D.
206. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
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evaluated in light of the surrounding circumstances and turns on the issue of
whether the trial was ultimately fair.20 7 The Nixon decision goes one step
further in widening what the courts can determine to be reasonable assis-
tance.
Though reviewing courts have previously been instructed always to
presume that a defense counsel's conduct was reasonable, Nixon strengthens
this presumption in that it allows attorneys to disregard the guilt phase of
their client's criminal trial almost completely.20 8 The Court noted that, due
to the specific facts in Nixon, the defense counsel had no real expectation
that, in light of the state's evidence against his client, he could put on a de-
fense adequate to raise a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds that Nixon
was not guilty of the crimes charged against him.20 9 Though defense coun-
sel's conduct might have been reasonable here, Nixon opens the door for
abuse. Nixon does not give guidance as to how much pretrial discovery and
preparation should be done before an attorney may reasonably decide to
forego challenging the prosecution in the guilt phase of a trial in order to
concentrate on the penalty phase. Often, a defensive strategy only emerges
after intense investigation. A lack of diligence on the part of defense coun-
sel could lead him or her to prematurely decide that the best strategy would
be to avoid disputing the state's evidence. This could especially be a prob-
lem for indigent defendants who are often appointed a counsel with an un-
workable caseload. 210 Attorneys who are overworked and underpaid might
be especially prone to abuse the reasoning in Nixon.
21 1
Nixon seems to suggest that the reasonableness of a defense counsel's
strategy depends on the appearance of guilt or innocence of the defendant.
This has been recognized as the "guilty anyway syndrome., 212 An attorney
who represents a defendant who is "factually culpable," meaning there is
little doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, seems to be
held to a lesser standard of reasonableness than an attorney whose client is
not factually culpable. 213 A major criticism of the Strickland standard is that
it only helps defendants who are factually innocent. 2 4 The holding in Nixon
only reaffirms this criticism.
207. Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 435-40.
208. Id.
209. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 556-58.
210. See generally Hall, supra note 155, at 235.
211. Id.





B. A Limited Presumption of Prejudice
The United States Supreme Court has held that prejudice can be pre-
sumed against a defendant when the "circumstances .. .are so likely to
prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular
case is unjustified." 215 In Bell v. Cone,216 the Court held that in order to
show a presumption of prejudice because of counsel's failure to challenge
the state's case, the failure must be complete.21 7 The holding in Nixon im-
plies that, in some instances, even a complete failure is not enough.
In Nixon, the defense counsel did not put on a defense, cross-examined
very few witnesses, and did not object to crime scene evidence, all after
conceding the defendant's guilt to the jury.21 8 Yet, the Supreme Court found
that this was not a failure to test the prosecution's case.219 Nixon seems to
indicate that as long as a defense counsel does something more than sit qui-
etly in the courtroom, prejudice cannot be presumed for a failure to materi-
ally challenge the state's case. This means that in order for a defendant to
forgo proving prejudice under Strickland, one of the other two exceptions
under Cronic must apply.220 Therefore, as long as the defendant is not de-
nied counsel totally and as long as the counsel participates in the trial, the
only way the defendant is afforded a presumption of prejudice under Cronic
is if the circumstances are such that even a competent attorney would not be
able to effectively assist the defendant.22'
C. The Attorney's Decision-Making Authority
The Strickland and Cronic decisions began a decline in the defendant's
right to make his own decisions regarding his criminal trial.222 Later cases
indicated that even when a defendant could prove that his attorney overrode
his wishes and interfered with his fundamental right to participate in the
management of his own trial, he still had to prove he was prejudiced under
Strickland in order to obtain relief.223 The holding in Nixon reaffirms this
position and continues with the trend of declining defendant autonomy.224
215. Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551, 562 (2004) (quoting U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
658 (1984)).
216. 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
217. Id. at 696-97.
218. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 557-58.
219. Id. at 562.
220. U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
221. Id.
222. Zelnick, supra note 104, at 384-85.
223. Id. See generally Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1985) (holding that there is no
constitutional right to give pejured testimony and defense counsel was not per se ineffective
when he blackmailed his client into changing his testimony in order to refrain from pejuring
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Even before Nixon, case law has recognized that an attorney has almost
complete discretion in making decisions against the client's wishes as long
as these decisions can be considered a reasonable trial strategy. Nixon
extends this discretion to concessions of guilt. According to Nixon, a defen-
dant, who has a constitutional right to testify in his own defense, can take
the stand, give his side of the story, declare his innocence, and his attorney
may then turn around and tell the jury that the defendant is guilty, implying
that the defendant committed perjury. An attorney's concession can invali-
date a defendant's right to testify, and in many situations, it can even im-
pose on the defendant's right to a jury trial by taking the issue of guilt or
innocence out of the hands of the jury.226 The Supreme Court in Nixon ulti-
mately said that a criminal defendant's fundamental, and even constitu-
tional, rights can be sidestepped by his defense counsel as long as the coun-
sel's decision to do so can be labeled as a reasonable trial strategy.
D. The Defendant's Ability to Seek Relief
The Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel has re-
peatedly been criticized as creating "an almost insurmountable hurdle" for
defendants seeking postconviction relief.227 Nixon only adds to this hurdle.
Nixon stands for the proposition that a defendant, who may be mentally ill,
is subject to the decisions made for him by his appointed defense counsel,
even without his consent, and if his counsel makes an error, the defendant
then also holds the burden of convincing a reviewing court that this error
amounted to a deficiency, and that this deficiency prejudiced him.
The United States Supreme Court embodies a strong belief that crimi-
nal trial attorneys provide adequate representation and that most ineffective
assistance claims are without merit.22 8 This mind-set, along with the enor-
mous burden of proof that Nixon and past precedent places on the defen-
dant, seems to almost negate the idea that criminal defendants are innocent
until proven guilty. If an attorney concedes the defendant's guilt to the jury,
as Nixon allows, the burden is on the defendant to persuade a reviewing
court that there was a possibility he could have been found innocent. The
defendant never had an opportunity to actually be innocent in the jury's
minds, and the state never actually held the burden of proving his guilt.
Thinking in these terms, a trial where a defendant is deprived of his consti-
himself); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (holding that a defense counsel's failure
to file a notice of appeal was not per se deficient).
224. Zelnick, supra note 104, at 384-85.
225. Id. at 387.
226. Id. at 388.
227. Calhoun, supra note 3, at 427.
228. Id. at 430.
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tutional right to have a jury determine his guilt or innocence cannot produce
a fair and just result, and when the burden is on the defendant to show this,
his ability to obtain postconviction relief is almost nonexistent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees all
criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel during the
criminal proceedings against him. 229 Though this right was once expanding
rapidly, United States Supreme Court precedent throughout the last twenty
years has all but slowed this expansion to a halt. Defendants making inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims face an extraordinary burden under the
Strickland standards. 230 Even if a defendant can show a reviewing court that
his defense counsel was deficient, he must still prove prejudice.231 It is diffi-
cult for a defendant to prove prejudice when the trial record reveals damn-
ing evidence against him.232 Though at first, the exceptions of Cronic were
thought to provide some relief, later holdings, including Nixon, have nar-
rowed these exceptions to the point where they are almost impossible to
reach.
Though the Strickland standard has been the subject of an enormous
amount of criticism, the Court has refused to depart from the rule it handed
down over twenty years ago.233 Nixon is only the most recent reminder of
229. U.S. CONST. amend. VI § 1.
230. Calhoun, supra note 3, at 427.
231. George C. Thomas III, History's Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REv. 543, 547 (2004).
232. Id.
233. Calhoun, supra note 3, at 427.
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this. Nixon creates an even harsher burden on defendants who believe they
have been denied their right to competent counsel by allowing more defer-
ence to be given to defense counsel regarding the reasonableness of their
performance, both by further limiting the circumstances under which the
defendant is relieved from proving prejudice and by giving the defense
counsel more authority to make decisions that contradict the wishes of the
defendant. If the Court continues to decide ineffective assistance of coun-
sel cases in the manner that it did in Nixon, the idea that a defendant con-
victed at trial can successfully challenge the competency of his defense
counsel and receive a new, fair trial will continue to diminish. The heavy
burden placed on defendants seeking relief from an ineffective counsel will
continue to grow heavier and heavier until the defendant's ability to obtain
this relief is almost nonexistent.
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